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✉ E-mail: m.miri@modares.ac.irAbstract: The regulation of distribution system operator is changing from the traditional approach to performance-based
regulation (PBR). In this study a novel PBR approach is proposed for the regulation of a distribution company with
consideration for asset management time scopes. In this regard a comprehensive separated regulation mechanism is
presented so that the total expenditure for asset management is categorised into two: capital expenditure (Capex) and
operational expenditure (Opex). A separate Capex and Opex regulation is proposed for electric distribution company
regulation. A new reward and penalty scheme is proposed to efficiently regulate the quality of the network at a
desirable level. The proposed methods are applied on the Iranian electricity distribution company.1 Introduction
Historically, distribution system operators (DSOs) have been
regulated by two regulation methods namely ‘cost of service’ and
‘rate of return’. Under these methods the profit of DSOs was
somehow dependent on their costs; they had very little incentive to
improve their efficiency [1–3]. To provide an incentive for DSOs,
performance-based regulations (PBR) are introduced to motivate
the DSOs to improve their efficiency and decrease costs [4]. PBR
is a tool in the regulatory scheme for providing incentives to a
regulated operator to behave in such a way that public interest is
promoted.
Although the proposed regulations motivate the DSOs to increase
their efficiency and cut costs, they lack incentives for service quality
and reliability [5]. Owing to the inherent weaknesses of the PBR,
regulators employ various forms of RPS to ensure reliability. RPS
induces the DSOs to provide reliable services through penalising
poor performance and rewarding good performance [6].
A typical form of the penalty/reward scheme is shown in Fig. 1.
As shown, the general form of RPS contains three zones: reward,
dead and penalty zones. The dead area is where neither a penalty
nor a reward is assessed. The penalty and reward areas are where
the performance of DSO is in poor and good levels, respectively.Fig. 1 A general RPS
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2674 This is an openThe reason for using a dead zone is to dampen unintended
penalties and rewards owing to stochastic variations in quality.
The penalty and reward areas are where the performance of a DSO
is in good and poor levels, respectively. As the reliability of
service is worsened or improved the penalties or rewards increase
respectively, and are capped where a certain value is reached
[6, 7]. The reliability indices utilised in RPS work is based on
system average measures of interruption, such as system average
interruption duration index (SAIDI) and system average
interruption frequency index (SAIFI) [8]. SAIDI is used in this
paper as the reliability index.
Utilising a reliability index in RPS is proposed in [9–12]. In [13]
an algorithm to obtain the parameters of RPS for each electric
company by using data envelopment analysis (DEA) and fuzzy
c-means (FCM) clustering is presented. A new method for
designing RPS-based Yardstick theory is proposed in [14].Fig. 2 Separated regulation mechanism
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Fig. 3 General framework of the proposed regulation method
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On the other hand, the global trend today is a movement towards a
more efficient electric distribution system and optimal utilisation of
available resources, in which asset management plays a decisive
role [15]. Asset management should contain strategic planning,
maintenance, utilisation, and operation of a physical resource. The
major challenge for a distribution company is to optimally manage
its assets along with its objectives, considering that there is a battle
between improving service reliability and controlling costs. Possible
time scales of asset management are real time, short term, midterm
and long term [16]. From a practical standpoint, there are
inter-relationships between the aforementioned timescales,
additionally it is known that the coordination of an asset
management’s timescales plays a critical role in strategic decision
making because of the actions occurring within each timescale
interacts [17].
In all the regulation strategy, this coordination has not been
considered. With regard to this issue, in this paper, as shown in
Fig. 2, a comprehensive separated regulation mechanism is
presented so that the total expenditure for asset management is
categorised to capital expenditure (Capex) and operational
expenditure (Opex). The separate Capex and Opex regulation is
proposed for efficient electric distribution company regulation.2 Proposed method
This paper considers short- and long-term asset management and a
comprehensive separated regulation mechanism of a distribution
company. The general framework of the proposed method is
shown in Fig. 3. The main objective of this paper is to determine
the optimal level of Opex and Capex as well as RPS parameters.
In this regard, at first similar companies are clustered by fuzzy
clustering method (FCM) based on factors that are outside the
control of the companies into different groups. [13] The variables
used for carrying out such classification are based on weather
conditions and network conditions. These variables are maximum
temperature (°C), minimum temperature (°C), precipitation (mm),
average wind speed (knot) and number of days with thunder,
density [number of customers per service area (C/km2)] and
quantity of energy supplied (MWh).
Then the optimal level of Opex of the ith year is determined by the
following equation:
Opexiopt,k = Opexikuio,k (1)
where Opexiopt,k , Opex
i
k and u
i
o,k are the optimal level of Opex,
operational cost and efficiency score of kth DisCo, respectively.
The efficiency score is computed by DEA by considering
operational cost as the input and the energy, number of customers
and peak load as the output of DEA [13]. Once the optimal Opex
is determined the RPS parameter is calculated as the following.Table 1 Result of the proposed method
Company Optimal Opex, M$ Reward a
CDZ, mm SD, min RS
A1 11.24 342 158
A2 16.32 364 158
A3 10.54 215 158
A4 15.63 589 158
A5 42.80 2724 158
A6 16.45 653 158
A7 13.24 371 158
A8 15.87 436 158
A9 28.42 1734 158
A10 12.22 501 158
A11 11.23 396 158
A12 9.62 842 158
A13 15.26 1045 158
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following equation:
CDZK = AveK 1+
RImax u
cdf
max ,j − ucdfk
( )
ucdfmax ,j − ucdfmin ,j
( )
⎛
⎝
⎞
⎠ (2)
where j denotes the cluster of the company, Avek is the historical
average reliability index of company k, RImax maximum reliability
index improvement and ucdf is the efficiency score which is
calculated considering customer damage cost as the input of the
DEA method.
Dead zone width: In this paper, it is determined to equal the
average standard deviation (SD) of the historical reliability index
for each cluster [18].
Max penalty and reward: these parameters are determined as
proposed in [13].
Reward and penalty ramp: The main objective of this paper is to
improve the quality of companies with low-quality levels and
prevent the deterioration of the level of quality. In this paper, the
reward and penalty ramp is determined by the following equation:
RS = ∂CIC
∂RI
(3)
where CIC is customer interruption cost and RI is the reliability
index. The annual CIC can be estimated with the method proposed
in [19].
The optimal level of Capex is determined at the end of the
regulatory period by the following equation:
Capexopt,k = Opexkuc,k (4)
where Capexopt,k, Opexk and θc,k are the optimal level of Capex,
capital expenditure and efficiency score of kth DisCo, respectively.
The efficiency score is computed by DEA by considering
operational interruption cost, capital interruption cost and CIC at
the regulatory period as the input and the energy, with the number
of customers and peak load as the output of DEA [13].3 Case study
The proposed method is tested on the Iranian distribution companies.
There are 39 electricity distribution companies in Iran and the
information on these companies is available at: www.tavanir.org.
Other required information is taken from [13]. Due to the page
constraint the regulatory period considered is 4 years and the
results are determined for the first cluster of the result of [13]. The
results of this paper are given in Table 1.
In this table, parameters of RPS and optimal level of Opex and
Capex are given. The average SD for the considered cluster isnd penalty scheme Optimal Capex, M$
, M$/nnn Max P, M$ Max R, M$
0.012 −1.818 1.371 13.92
0.028 −5.926 2.870 22.45
0.0101 −0.853 0.141 17.14
0.014 −1.504 1.504 21.16
0.032 −2.275 2.275 28.18
0.028 −3.882 1.969 17.16
0.015 −2.758 1.764 17.14
0.022 −2.854 0.270 20.24
0.036 −3.877 3.877 34.32
0.042 −2.793 2.793 10.8
0.013 −4.535 3.267 14.64
0.013 −7.773 5.346 22.43
0.011 −2.613 2.613 12.42
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158 min and the width of the dead zone is equal to this value. Using
the formula of (2) and (3) the CDZ and ramp of reward and penalty
scheme is determined for each company respectively. Other
parameters of RPS are determined based on [13]. The optimal
level of Opex and Capex is calculated based on each distribution
company efficiency score and the real cost.4 Conclusion
To provide an incentive, PBR is introduced to motivate the DSOs to
improve the quality and efficiency by increasing the reliability index
and decreasing the operational and capital costs respectively.
Distribution companies use different asset management strategies
to achieve this objective. Due to the inter-relations between
timescales of asset management, the integration of timescale
impact on regulation strategy plays a critical role. With regard to
this issue in this paper, the total cost of each company was
categorised into the operational interruption cost, capital
interruption cost and CIC. Then the DEA was implemented on the
distribution companies in three steps based on the efficiency score
which was calculated with each step having the optimal level of
Opex and Capex as well as efficient parameter of the reward and
penalty scheme determined. The proposed algorithm creates
financial incentives for distribution companies to improve or
maintain their quality levels on the one hand, and control their
operational and capital costs on the other. Also the long-term
investment will be optimally done as it is required.5 References
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